Abstract-Despite the growing threat posed by Android malware, the research community is still lacking a comprehensive view of common behaviors and trends exposed by malware families active on the platform. Without such view, the researchers incur the risk of developing systems that only detect outdated threats, missing the most recent ones. In this paper, we conduct the largest measurement of Android malware behavior to date, analyzing over 1.2 million malware samples that belong to 1.2K families over a period of eight years (from 2010 to 2017). We aim at understanding how the behavior of Android malware has evolved over time, focusing on repackaging malware. In this type of threats different innocuous apps are piggybacked with a malicious payload (rider), allowing inexpensive malware manufacturing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Android app ecosystem has grown considerably over the recent years, with over 3 million Android apps currently available at the Google Play official market [6] and with an average of 28,180 uploads per day to alternative markets such as Aptoide [7] . The number of unwanted apps has continued to increase at a similar pace. While it is unclear how many unwanted samples have hit Google Play, alarming detection rates have been reported in other markets. For instance, in early 2016 Aptoide took down up to 85% of the samples (742,638) that were uploaded in just one month after these were deemed harmful to the users. More recently, researches have discovered the largest malware campaign found on Google Play with over 36 million infected devices [10] .
The increase in the number of malicious apps has come hand in hand with the proliferation of collective repositories sharing the latest specimens together with intelligence about them. VirusTotal [45] and Koodous [23] are two online services available to the community that allow security operators to upload samples and scan them for threat assessment. While there are extensive sets of malware available, most past research work focused their efforts on outdated datasets. One of the most popular datasets used in the literature is the Android MalGenome project [54] and the version extended by authors in [8] , named Drebin dataset. While very useful as a reference point, these datasets span a period of time between 2010 and 2012, and might therefore not be representative of current threats. Other efforts include More recent approaches are starting to incorporate "modern malware" to their evaluation [29] , [4] , [30] with little understanding of (i) the harm those samples can pose to users or (ii) how prominent those threats are in practice. Understanding these two factors in perspective plays a key role for automated approaches that rely on machinelearning to model the notion of harm-if such systems are trained on datasets that are outdated or not representative of the current malware threats, the resulting detection systems will be ineffective in protecting users.
Despite the need for a better understanding of current Android malware behavior, previous work is limited. The first and almost only seminal work putting Android malware in perspective is dated back to 2012, by Zhou and Jiang [54] . In their work, the authors dissected and manually vetted 1,200 malware samples categorizing them into 49 families. Most of the malware reported (about 90%) was so-called repackaging, which is malware that piggybacks the malicious payload into various legitimate applications. The remaining 10% accounts for standalone pieces of malicious software. In the literature, the legitimate portion of code is referred to as carrier and the malicious payload is known as rider [52] . In a recent paper published in 2017 [27] , authors presented a study showing how riders are inserted into carriers. The scope of their work span from 2011 to 2014 and cover 950 pairs of apps.
In this work, we aim at providing a comprehensive view of the evolution of Android malware and its current behavior. To this end, we analyze over 1.28 million malicious samples belonging to 1.2K families collected from 2010 to 2017. Unlike previous studies [54] , the vast number of samples scrutinized in this work causes human analysis to be prohibitive. Therefore, we develop tools that allow us to automatically analyze our dataset. A particularly important challenge is identifying the rider part of an Android malware sample. Our intuition is that miscreants aggressively repackage many benign applications with the same malicious payload. Our analysis framework works in two steps. First, it relies on recent advances on the systematization of informative labels obtained from multiple Anti-Virus (AV) vendors [38] , [21] , to infer the family of a sample. Second, it uses differential analysis to remove code segments that are irrelevant to the particular malware family, allowing us to study the behavior of the riders alone. Differential analysis has successfully been applied to detect prepackaging in the past [42] , [11] , however it has not been used to study the behavior of the riders.
We find that riders changed their behavior considerably over time. While in 2010 it was very common to have malware monetized by sending premium rate text messages, nowadays only a minority of malware families exhibit that behavior, and rather exfiltrate personal information or use other monetization tricks. We also find that the use of obfuscation techniques dramatically increased since the early days of Android malware, with specimens nowadays pervasively using native code and including external scripts to avoid easy analysis. This contrasts with the amount of legitimate apps that are currently obfuscated-a recent investigation shows that less than 25% of apps in Google Play are obfuscated [47] , while we show that over 90% of the riders have the ability to use advanced obfuscation techniques. A consequence of this is that antimalware systems trained on carriers and/or older datasets might not be effective in detecting the most recent threats, especially when they only rely on static analysis.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first up-to-date systematic study of malicious rider behaviors in the Android app ecosystem at large. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a system to extract rider behaviors from repackaged malware. Our system uses differential analysis on top of annotated control flow graphs extracted from code fragments of an app.
• We present a systematic study of the evolution of rider behaviors in the Android malware ecosystem. Our study measures the prevalence of malicious functionality across time from a cross-layer perspective.
• We show that our system can be effectively used by an analyst to study unknown malware families, allowing her to better understand the operation and the purpose of riders.
• We analyze the most important findings of our study and with respect to the most relevant works in the area of Android malware detection. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first describe the landscape and introduce the framework used to extract rider behaviors ( §II). We then present our study measuring code from the main Dalvik executable ( §III) and from key accompanying resources ( §IV). We illustrate how differential analysis works in §V and we discuss our findings in §VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES A general overview of the measurement methodology is depicted in Figure 1 . For the sample collection we queried AndroZoo in April 2017 [4] , an online repository of samples from a variety of sources including Google Play, several unofficial markets, and different torrent sources. AndroZoo contains over 5.7M samples, and the largest source of apps is Google Play (with 73% of the apps), followed by Anzhi (with 13%). Out of all apps in the dataset, a large portion of samples have been reported as malicious by different independent AV vendors (over 25%). Interestingly, AndroZoo has reported peaks of about 22% infection rates in the Google Play [4] , constituting the absolute largest source of malware. In our current snapshot of the AndroZoo dataset, about 14% of the apps from Google Play have been flagged as malware by at least one AV vendor. The information about the AV vendors is offered by VirusTotal, a subsidiary of Google that runs multiple AV engines and offers an unbiased access to resulting reports [45] . AV detection engines are limited, and they certainly do not account for all the malware existing in the wild. This is known as zero-day malware. The study of this type of malware is out of the scope of this measurement. However, we emphasize that both AndroZoo and VirusTotal keep track of the date where a sample was first seen and this is leveraged to understand the time when the malware was operating. Note as well that as time progresses the amount of zero-day malware is expected to be lower for the earlier periods of our eight-year long study.
For the label collection we relied on AV labels from 63 different vendors provided by VirusTotal. A common problem in malware labeling is that different AV vendors use different denominations for the same family [38] . To solve this problem, we unified these labels using Euphony [21] , an open-source tool that uses fine-grained labeling to report family names for Android. Euphony clusters malware based on the AV reports obtained from VirusTotal, inferring their family names with high accuracy-with an F-measure performance of 95.5%. It is important to note that no a-priori knowledge on malware families is needed. Figure 2 shows the number of families observed across time. The stacked plot distinguishes between newly observed and previously seen families at every quarter of a year. Seen families account for the set of families where one specimen (of that family) was seen in VirusTotal prior to the referred date. After unifying labels and processing all samples as described in Section II-B, we account for over 1.2 million apps and 1.2K families. The graph depicts the overall number of samples per quarter used in this measurement.
A. Landscape
Our first experiment aims at understanding how families evolve over time from a structural viewpoint. For that, we study the top families according to the following four definitions:
• Largest Families: top(|F i |). We take a look at the top families ordered by the number of samples in each family (|F i |), where |F i | < |F i−1 |∀i = {1, . . . , n}. Note that this metric only takes in account the number of samples observed in a family, and not the total number of installations.
• Prevalent Families: top(|Q j i |). Top prevalent families are ordered by the number of quarters (of a year) where a sample of a family has been seen; where Q j i denotes quarter j in which a sample of a family i was seen. This metric aims to identify the most long-lasting malware families.
• Viral Families: top(|F i |/|Q j i |), where we look at the ratio between how large a family is and the number of quarters in which the family was present. This metric aims at identifying malware families that are both large and also last for a long period of time.
• Stealthy Families: top(D i ), where D i denotes the average time delta T vt − T dex between the moment when the sample of a family i was compiled (T dex ) and the first time the sample was seen in VirusTotal (T vt ). This metric looks at how difficult it is for malware detectors to identify the samples in a family as malicious. Figure 3 shows the distribution of apps in top families for each of the categories described above. The graph depicts the probability density of the data at different values together with the standard elements of a boxplot (whiskers representing the maximum and minimum values, and the segments inside the boxes the average and the median). To cover a wider range of cases, only unique families are shown across all four plots. Although some families are not listed in the graphs, it is worth noting that AIRPUSH appears within the top 10 in all four categories, LEADBOLT appears in all categories except for the viral one, and other families such as JIAGU, REVMOB, YOUMI, and KUGUO appear in both largest and viral categories. As observed in the timeline given at Figure 3 , some families show multiple distributions indicating that there are outbreaks at different time periods. This is presumably when malware authors created a new variant of a family. The similar alignment for the second outbreak in some of the families might be explained by the latency with which AV vendors submit samples to VirusTotal. Also, it has been reported [17] , [49] that at times miscreants use VirusTotal before distributing samples to test whether their specimens are detected by AVs or not. In either case, this is still a good indicator of how malicious behaviors span over time and one can observe that 2014 and 2016 reported the largest activity.
Special emphasis should be given to SAFEKIDZONE and PIRATES. The former appears as a top prevalent family and the distribution of samples across time is remarkably uniform. This means that the malware creator has been persistently manufacturing new specimens across four years almost as if the process was automated. The latter starts the outbreak aggressively in mid 2013-unlike most of the other families where infections start progressively.
B. Differential Analysis
In this paper, we aim at establishing a systematic way of extracting rider methods. For that, we mine methods that are common to members of the same family. Our underlying assumption is that samples belonging to the same family have the same purpose and are written by the same authors, and therefore there will be code in common with all the malware samples in the family. In the simplest case, this common code will be present in all samples in the family. In other cases, for example when a malware family is composed of several subfamilies, it will be manifested in a subset of the samples. Those methods that are not common to members of the same family are deemed irrelevant to characterizing the behavior of the app and discarded.
To identify which methods are common among samples of the same family, we build on top of a system called Dendroid [42] .
Dendroid uses text mining to analyze code structures in Android malware families and runs static analysis to extract a high-level representation of the Control Flow Graph (CFG) associated to fragments of an app. In particular, it uses methods as atomic units of code. A hash (fingerprint) of the CFG of each fragments is computed. We then compare the set of common fingerprints for each family. Comparing fingerprints of smaller units of code to measure the similarity between two apps is known as fuzzy hashing. Fuzzy hashing has been shown to be an effective way of modeling repackaged apps [53] . A similar methodology was also applied to Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) in [11] . Unlike Dendroid, we are not interested in fragments that are unique to a family (i.e., fully discriminant fragments), but in all the methods that are common to the samples of a certain malware family.
We extended Dendroid to recursively extract fragments from all available resources within the app of type DEX or APK. The reason for this is that malware often hides its malicious payload in DEX or in APK files hosted as a resource of the main app. When the app is executed, the malware then dynamically loads the hidden component. This is referred in the literature as incognito apps [40] . We also extended Dendroid to consider the semantics of each basic block in the CFG. This semantic is extracted from the parameters of all Dalvik instructions related to invoke-* such as invoke-virtual. These parameters typically refer to the invocation of libraries (including those from the Android framework, namely Application Programming Interface) as we detail in Section III-A. This allow us to combine fuzzy hashing with a technique known as feature hashing [19] . Feature hashing reduces the dimensionality of the data analyzed and, therefore, the complexity of computing similarities among their feature sets.
C. Common Methods in our Dataset
The total number of samples in our dataset after unifying AV labels accounts for almost 1.3 million apps and 3K families. Prior to running the differential analysis, we process the dataset to extract all classes and build the CFG of their methods. When processing these samples we found that approximately 1% of the apps were malformed or could not be unpacked. Also, due to the nature of the differential analysis we discard families with less than 7 samples leaving a total of 1,282,022 malicious apps and 1,226 families. Figure 4 shows the number of methods common to all samples of the 1,226 families. It also displays the number When all the methods seen in a family appear in all of the samples it means that either the family is standalone malware (without a carrier) or that all members in the family are repackaging the same goodware. We refer to the latter phenomenon as early-stage repackaging. While standalone families are relevant to our analysis, there is no a priori way to know the type when only looking at the number of common methods. For this reason, we avoid running differential analysis on families where at least 90% of their total methods are common to all samples of the family. This accounts for 25 families (542 samples), which is 0.04% of the dataset. As for the remaining 1,201 families we observe that the proportion of methods in common varies across families regardless of their size. An exception to this are very large families, where the number of common methods is lower than the average.
Malware development is a continuous process, and criminals often improve their code producing variants of the same malware family. Our framework has the potential to trace the appearance of such variants. As an illustrative example, we study the prevalence of methods across some of the top apps in each of the categories presented in Section II-A. Figure 5 shows the example of five malware families in our dataset. When looking at ANYDOWN, we observe that there are 285 methods common to 99% of the 17,000 samples in the family. The functionality embedded into these methods constitute the essence of the family. Even when the number of methods in common to all samples of the family is small, there are still a number of methods common to subsets of samples from the family. For instance, there are only 10 methods shared by 99% of the samples in LEADBOLT but about 75% the apps (23,000) share more than 150 methods. This can be explained by the morphing nature of malware. It is commonplace to see malware families evolving as markets block the first set of apps in the campaign [37] . This ultimately translates into different variants that are very similar. Interestingly, we can observe that the boundaries defining variants of a family are sometimes well established. This is the case of ADMOGO, a family that altogether has about 20,000 samples. We can see a variant with 2,683 methods common to 67.65% of the samples, and we can see another variant with one additional method in common (i.e., 2,684) shared by only 36.11% of those samples.
D. Choice of a cutoff
To be able to operate, our approach needs a cutoff. This cutoff determines the fraction of apps within a family that need to share a method before our method considers it as being representative of that malware family. Ideally, to capture the behavior of a family we would look at common methods in all apps (100% threshold). However, in practice this is not the best choice because AV vendors can accidentally assign to wrong labels to a sample [13] , [31] , [22] . In our experiments we set this threshold to 90% based on the F-measure performance reported by Euphony (92.7%~95.5% [21] ). We consider this threshold to be a good value to capture the behavior of families, while allowing some margin for mislabeled samples.
Intuitively, different cutoffs could be set to identify methods that are not common to entire families, but are indicative of specific variants (see §II-C). Due to space constraint, we do not explore this possibility in this paper, but in §VI we discuss how this direction could be explored in future work.
III. RIDER BEHAVIORS
We use the techniques described in the previous section to study and characterize rider behaviors in Android malware from 2010 to 2017. We first introduce the set of behaviors that we explore, and then give an overview of the general state. Finally, we study the evolution of such behaviors over time.
A. Behaviors
To understand how malware behaves, we analyze rider methods from all observed malware families. We are primarily interested in learning whether malware exhibits actions related to certain attack goals as characterized in [43] . In particular, we are looking at actions related to:
• Privacy Violations. These actions typically involve queries to the Android Content Resolver framework, the use of File Access system, or the access to information such as the Location of the user, among others.
• Exfiltration. The usage of the network combined together with all those actions related to privacy violations can indicate the leakage of personal information.
• Fraud. These actions aim at getting direct profit from the users or the services they use. For instance, malware might send premium rate messages via the SMS Manager or it might abuse advertisement networks by changing the affiliate ID to redirect revenues.
• Evasion. Hardware serial numbers, versions of firmware and other OS configurations are often used to fingerprint sandboxes to evade dynamic analysis.
• Obfuscation. The use of obfuscation and other hiding techniques is a sought after functionality to evade static analysis. Android offers the option to dynamically load code during runtime (e.g., with reflection).
• Exploitation. Certain apps implement technical exploits and attempt to gain root access after being installed. Most of these exploits are implemented in native code and triggered using bash scripts that are packed together with the app in the resources directory. To measure these behaviors we look at invocations to the Application Programming Interface (API) used to access key features of the Android OS or data within the device. APIs are especially relevant in current smartphones as they incorporate a number of mechanisms to confine and limit malware activity. These mechanisms make apps dependent on the Android framework and all sensitive calls are delivered through a well-established program interface. Furthermore, API calls are useful for explaining the behavior of an app and reporting its capabilities.
Android APIs are organized as a collection of packages and sub-packages grouping related libraries together. On the top of the package structure we can find, for instance, libraries from the android. * , dalvik. * , and java. * packages. On the next level, we can find subpackages such as android.os. * , dalvik.system. * , or java.lang.reflect. * , among others. As most of the sub-packages belong to the android. * package, for the sake of simplicity, in this paper we refer to them starting from the second level. For instance, android.provider. * , which is a standard interface to data in the device, is referred as the PROVIDER category. For other packages (e.g.: dalvik.system. * ), we use the full name (i.e., DALVIK SYSTEM) with an underscore.
While program analysis can tell what are the set of API calls that appear in an executable, it is hard to understand what these calls are used for. However, there are some APIs that are typically used by riders for certain purposes. This is the case of APIs that load dynamic code, use reflection or use of cryptography. These are specially relevant to malware detection as they enable the execution of dynamic code [34] and allow the deobfuscation of encrypted code [3] : i) JAVA NATIVE: This API category captures libraries that are used to bridge the Java runtime environment with the Android native environment. The most relevant API in this category is java.lang.System.loadLibrary(), which can load ELF executables prior to their interaction through the Java Native Interface (JNI). ii) DALVIK SYSTEM: This category allow the execution of code that is not installed as part of an app. The following API call is key for the execution of incognito Dalvik executables: dalvik.system.ClassLoader.DexClassLoader(). iii) JAVA EXEC: This API category allow apps to interface with the environment in which they are run- ning. The most relevant API in this category is java.lang.Runtime.exec(), which executes the command specified as a parameter in a separate process. This can be used to run text executables. iv) JAVA REFLECTION: This category contains a number of APIs that make possible the inspection of classes and methods at runtime without knowing them at compilation time. This can be very effective to hider static analysis (e.g., by hiding APIs). v) JAVAX CRYPTO: These APIs provide a number of cryptographic operations that can be used to obfuscate and de-obfuscate payloads. It is important to highlight that the categories described above are not comprehensive and the same set of APIs can be used for different purposes. For instance, accessing the contacts (via the PROVIDER) can be used both for leaking personal information or for evasion 1 .
B. Overview
Overall, for the 1.2 million apps in our dataset we observe a total of 155.7 million methods, out of which about 1.3 million are rider methods. The average number of methods per app is 121 and the largest number of different methods in one single family reaches 16.5 millions. Overall, each family has on average 1,225 raider methods. We deep inspect those methods to query the set of behaviors discussed in the previous section. Table I summarizes the most relevant groups of behaviors found and their prevalence in the studied families. As expected, families persistently query the OS framework (i.e., the ANDROID category) to access phone resources. The most prevalent functions from the Android framework are android.app. * (APP category), and android.os. * (OS category). These packages provide support for interprocess communication and basic operating system services (e.g., AsyncTask, Activities and Services). Another category widely used is CONTENT, which gives access to certain private information. This is used in over 70% of the riders seen and over 80% of the families. Other private information such as the location (LOCATION category) is observed in 21% of the families. This accounts for about 4% of the samples in the entire dataset. The use of the network (NET category) is seen in 46% of the families. When looking at the total number of samples that use the network we observe that reaches to 12% of the families. Access to the content providers together with the use of the network, can indicate the exfiltration of personal information.
There are four different groups of interfaces that can be used to dynamically load code at runtime, DALVIK SYSTEM JAVA REFLECTION, JAVA NATIVE and JAVA EXEC. When looking at the use of dynamic Dalvik code, we find that the DALVIK SYSTEM category is only used in 7% of the families and 1% of the samples. This means that overall very few families have the capability of dynamically manipulating Dalvik code at runtime. When looking at the dynamic manipulation of Java code, (JAVA REFLECTION category) we observe that 42% of the families and 11% of the total samples show evidences of this behavior. This indicates that Java-based obfuscation is not a stock feature used by all malware developers, yet it is persistently found in our dataset. One of the most popular API calls in this category is Java.lang.Class.getClassLoader(), which ac- It is worth noting that cryptographic functions can be used by ransomware to encrypt user files as well. We also provide evidence of this in §V-A. When looking at other forms of dynamic execution, we see a drop in popularity. In particular, we can observe that the use of native code (JAVA NATIVE category) drops to 15% of the families. Despite this drop, the total number of samples using native executables is much larger than those using reflection (with about 18% of the dataset and roughly 200K pieces of malware). As for the use of JAVA EXEC, we see a drop in both the number of families and the number of samples with respect to the other types of dynamic execution. This evidences the morphing nature of families and suggests that certain variants of a family might become more sophisticated over time.
The use of the TELEPHONY category accounts for 26% of the families and 74% of the samples. The use of this category is usually indicative of evasion, but it could also be used to exfiltrate certain serial numbers from the device to track the user. Other hardware components such as the sensors or those from the GESTURE category can also be used for these purposes. In this case, however, their prevalence indicates that families are not currently relying on them. For instance, the use of GESTURE only accounts for 0.6% of the families. Our results also indicate that premium-rate frauds, which fall into the SMS category, are not used at large with only 2% of the families. This type of fraud was thought to be very prevalent, accounting for about 18% of families (30 out of 171) in Drebin [39] . While the number of families exhibiting the SMS category is remarkably small, it is worth noting that scrutinized samples span through a drifting eight-year period. We next show how these, and other behaviors, have evolved over time.
C. Evolution over Time
Malware is a moving target and behaviors drift over time as miscreants modify their goals and attempt to avoid detection. In this section we measure how behaviors evolved across several years. According at the type of API call, we group behaviors into three categories: (i) sensitive APIs, (ii) network communication, and (iii) obfuscation. Figure 6 shows behaviors associated to families by quarter of a year for each of the categories. The graphs represent the proportion of families that exhibit a certain capability in a given quarter, showing how families evolve over time. It is possible to observe that, as discussed in II-A, the distribution of malware samples per quarter is not uniform, but there are two spikes in our data, one in Q1 2014 and one in Q4 2015 (399 and 819 families acting in those quarters, respectively). On average, the number of families observed per quarter is 280. Regardless of the presence of these two spikes, when looking at how behaviors evolve overall, one can typically observe a trend based on how prevalent API calls are across time. To study this, we plot the best fit to each set of API calls using linear regression. Note that the cutoff here is applied to the samples of a family that were observed during that quarter (see Figure 2 for a snapshot of the number of samples and families seen per quarter). As samples in a family are scattered throughout time, this timeline gives an understanding of how the family evolves, which naturally fits with the notion of variant discussed in §II.
Sensitive APIs: Figure 6a shows behaviors related to generic actions such as File System (FS) actions or OS-related APIs. FS-and OS-related behaviors are typically found in families that attempt to execute an exploit [1] These behaviors include the use of API calls such as Process.killProcess() or Process.myPid(). Also, IO operations such as File.mkdir() are used in preparation to the exploitation. Most of these behaviors have increased sharply over the last few years all the way to 75% for Process.myPid() or 80% for File.mkdir().
Network Communication: Figure 6b shows behaviors related to network communications in general. One of the first takeaways that can be obtained is related to the negative trend in the use of the SmsManager.sendTextMessage() API. This API call is usually associated to a common fraud that profits from silently sending premium rate messages. As shown in the timeline, this type of malware was popular between the end of 2012 and 2014. One factor behind the popularity of this fraud was its simplicity (it typically does not require the support of a back-end). However, starting from mid 2014 this behavior sees a drop in popularity-from about 40% to 10% of the families. Interestingly, we observe that the overall use of the SMS category in Table I is lower than in any point of the time line. Recall that Figure 6 represents samples active only in a given period, which is closely related to the presence of behaviors from variants of a family operating in a given time. Instead, Table I presents a macro-perspective overview, which shows the prevalence of behaviors attributed to the backbone of the family. Thus, the level of granularity shown when measuring rider behaviors in a time-line manner is much more precise than when looking at a macro perspective. We can also observe that the use of the HttpURLConnection.connect() API call has increased over the last years. This API call when combined together with those related to privacy violations (e.g., ContentResolver.query()) is commonly used to exfiltrate personal information [15] . This information is most likely sold on underground markets or used as part of a larger operation [32] (see Section V for a case study discussing exfiltration of personal information). HttpURLConnection.connect() can also be used to retrieve new payloads, which is known as update attacks. The use of more sophisticated attacks such as those requiring the support of a Command & Control (C&C) structure indicate a change in the way miscreants monetize their creations from the initial premium-rate fraud [43] . This can be attributed in part to the proliferation of inexpensive bulletproof servers or robust botnet structures that allow campaigns to last longer [5] , [20] .
We also observe behaviors could be aimed at evading dynamic analysis. As mentioned earlier, malware often queries certain hardware attributes (or sensor values) that are usually set to default in sandboxes. This is the case of the values given by Connectivity.getActiveNetwork() or Wifi.getConnectionInfo() API calls. Although the latter is not shown in the figure, both increase with a similar trend reaching 70% and 55% of the families by 2017 respectively.
Obfuscation: The use of reflection has increased over the last years from slightly over 20% of the families in 2012 to about 50-60% in 2016 and 2017 as shown in Figure 6c . The use of this feature can be mainly attributed to obfuscation. Other forms of obfuscation can be evidenced by looking at the evolution of the crypt category, which is one the most prevalent ones. The number of families using cryptographic APIs started at 100% in 2011 and dropped to 60% in the following year. Soon after that, we observe a uniform increase reaching 90% in 2017. This most likely means that back in 2011 miscreants that started manufacturing malware for Android had a high technical expertise. As Android became the platform of choice, more actors with different expertise were involved and the use of crypt dropped the next years, to become a common feature a few years thereafter, perhaps out of necessity to evade malware detection systems. Another form of loading Java code during runtime is via the ClassLoader.DexClassLoader() API call. Results show that the usage of this interface increases over the years to 70% in 2017. To trace the use of incognito apps, we recursively looked at all APK and DEX resources in the app and analyzed their methods. Common methods originating from incognito apps are, however, not prevalent. This means that hiding code relevant to the family via incognito apps is either not popular or not evident-note that advanced hiding techniques can be effectively used to evade automated systems [41] .
Interestingly, we can observe that the use of System.loadLibrary(), which is related to the invocation of native libraries, has increased sharply over the years from 25% in 2011 to 80% in 2017. With a more modest trend we observe that Runtime.exec() is still very prevalent nowadays. These two APIs are the main entry point for dynamically loading non-Java code that is not installed as part of the application. The most common executables loaded are ELF executables and text executables respectively. As behaviors offloaded to these components can not be seen from Dalvik, we deep inspect the resources of each app and report these findings in §IV.
Recent work studied the use of obfuscation on goodware on the Google Play store [47] Authors showed that less than 25% of apps have been obfuscated by the primary developer. Instead, we show that the obfuscation in malware is way more prominent. This might explain why the proliferation of malware have been so acute over the recent years-while miscreants can easily process un-obfuscated carriers to build new versions of their malware, security experts are, more than ever before, confronted with obfuscated riders. The increasingly prevalent use of reflection, of native libraries, and scripts indicates that the behaviors that we observe by performing static analysis might not constitute the full set of actions performed by malware when executed-we refer the reader to §VI for a discussion on the limitations of our work. This also means that recent ML-based works in the area of malware detection that do not take into account obfuscation are most likely modeling the behaviors seen in the carriers rather than those belonging to the riders. Thus, we argue that there is a strong need for a change of paradigm in the malware detection realm. We argue that the community should focus efforts on building novel detection techniques capable of dealing with obfuscation.
IV. RESOURCES
Malware authors often offload payloads from the Dalvik executable to make the application look benign to cursory inspection [34] , [3] . Previously, we showed that the use of incognito apps 2 is not very prevalent.
In this section, we analyze other type of executables that are often packed together into the APK and they are generally overlooked by current Android malware detection systems [40] , [48] .
A. Resource Extraction
We look at the header of all resources in an app and analyze the magic number that is used to identify the file format. We select those files that are strongly typed and we further analyze those that are executables. In particular, we look at text executables such as bash scripts used to run shell commands, and at ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) executables used to load native libraries. From all files selected, we computed their hash and studied the prevalence of common resources across apps in the family by looking at exact hash matches. We then use a cutoff of 30% to study their prevalence in a family. We choose this threshold because higher thresholds reported a low number of common resources, possibly because of the pervasive use of obfuscation (as we will see). Out of all families in our dataset, we only found about 44 with common text or ELF executables. As we saw in the previous section, malware's use of cryptography is increasing over time, and this might explain the small number of unobfuscated librararies and scripts observed in our dataset.
B. Text Executables
Text executables (such as shell scripts) constitute an easy way of reusing existing malicious code-they facilitate porting payloads across different platforms and are used to bridge Javaland components and executables compiled in native code. They also enable attackers to access a suite of admin-or system-related commands such as mount to re-mount, for instance, partitions with higher privileges (typically to add writing permission into the system image and install root tools or other useful utilities 3 ). We refer the reader to Appendix A • busybox
for an illustrative example of the type of text executables embedded within the resources of an app. In our study, we parse every text executable that is in common to the sample of malware families using the threshold introduced earlier. We extract a set of features for each file, i.e.: we look at the frequency of bash commands (and other relevant keywords) observed in different payloads in the wild. Table IV (also in Appendix A) summarizes some of these features. Overall, we observe behaviors related the following features: rm, grep, mkdir, /system/bin/sh, start, and /data/data. These behaviors have been observed in only four families. One can immediately observe that the number of families with common scripts in plain-text is negligible. However, in §III-B we showed that about 9% of the families exhibit the use of JAVA EXEC (associated to the execution of scripts) as shown in Table I . While a significant number of families can potentially execute scripts, a larger number (about 20%) also shows the use of cryptographic behaviors. In our analysis, we can only account for resources that are both in plain text and have not been modified (using for instance polymorphism). This small number could also be attributed to the proliferation of update attacks, where the payload is offloaded from the APK. We refer the reader to Section VI for a discussion on the limitations of our approach.
During our experiments we observed that the use of scripts is more prevalent in certain variants than in entire families. This indicates that most likely variants in families have adopted the use of obfuscation or any other form of code mangling later in their lifecycle and resources in some earlier variants remain un-obfuscated.
C. ELF Executables
Android uses ELF shared object libraries for both the Java Native Interface and for Android Runtime (ART) applications. These type of libraries are typically developed in C/C++ and provide developers with efficient mechanisms to directly access certain hardware modules. Many malware families rely on these executables because they can be easily be ported from other Unix systems. This way, miscreants have access to a large portfolio of tools than can run in Android devices with minimal effort. Table II shows the name of some libraries found in our dataset. One can find utility libraries aiming at escalating privileges such as the panda_super_shell, or the stagefrightCheck, and crashCheck libraries. Stagefright is a group of Android bugs that attempts to crash the system by sending crafted images or videos to the mediaserver-the sub-system responsible for processing media file in Android. Also, goDEX and dexop are known libraries that can inspect other DEX files, which can be used to manipulate incognito apps or to exploit vulnerable apps installed in the device. It is also possible to find other libraries that can be used to configure Bluetooth connections such as hcitool. These examples give an idea of the type of executables that are typically embedded in malware.
ELF executables in Android use the Bionic C library 4 and a dynamic linker that loads shared libraries at runtime. In our work we study well-defined library dependencies that are declared at compilation time and are needed to load linked functions to the Bionic libraries (libc, libdl, libpthread, etc) during runtime. These functions are used to invoke critical system calls such as ioctl, which is used for Android's inter-procedural and inter-component communication (ICC). In particular, we look at the sh_link linking section in the file header and extract the ancillary information needed to understand which shared libraries are loaded and to which functions are linked to. Table V ( cf. Appendix B) shows the prevalence of studied functions. Similar to the case of of text executables, the number of families with common ELFs is small. This is again expected as these type of resources are also commonly obfuscated [3] .
The most popular behaviors are abort(), memcpy(), open() or kill().
These behaviors are associated to operations invoked when trying to gain privilege escalation via exploitation. Other functions observed associated to the use of vulnerability exploitation techniques are: malloc() 5 Figure 8 . On another note, we can observe the use of getopt() and getopt long(). This function parses the command-line arguments, which might indicate that some of these ELFs are invoked from bash scripts.
, fork(), getpid(), chmod(), or chown(). Note that modifying both the ownership (chown) and the permissions (chmod) of files is also done from text scripts as shown in
Surprisingly, the use of ioctl() is not very prevalent. This shows that common ELF libraries are typically not used for accessing information through the Android ICC Binder protocol (e.g., personal information such as the location or other information stored in content providers such as the contacts). It is also possible to observe the use of network activity as shown with socket(), inet addr, gethostbyname, getnetbyaddr, and getnetbyname. One can further observe the use of certain functions from libraries such as libiptc to interact with the module in charge of firewalling and packet filtering the device (see for instance, iptc append entry, xtables chain protos, or iptables globals, among other related functions not listed in the table).
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section we present three case studies to illustrate how differential analysis can be used to analyze and understand rider behaviors. In particular, we have selected (i) a case study from a sophisticated long-lasting ransomware campaign, (ii) two shady advertisement libraries that have infected over 11K apps, and (iii) a recent but viral malware family that has been operating in 2017. These case studies show that our methodology is effective in identifying the important methods 4 The standard C library developed by Google for Android. 5 As well as calloc(), and realloc(). A. Ransomware: The case of SIMPLOCKER We first study the case of SIMPLOCKER, a ransomware that has been operating since 2014Q3 and mainly targeted Google Play. While there are several ransomware families in our dataset such as JISUT, SLOCKER, GEPEW, or SVPENG to name a few, SIMPLOCKER is one of the first confirmed fileencrypting malware families targeting Android [18] . The way Android ransomware operated prior to this family made file recovery possible without paying the ransom. In particular, these early versions attempted to keep user information hostage by simply locking their devices but without encrypting the file system. Technical experts could then bypass the locking mechanism using standard forensic tools (e.g., mounting the file system from a PC).
Our dataset accounts for 30 specimens of SIMPLOCKER with a total of 35,825 distinct methods. Out of those, 1,166 (3.2%) methods are common to at least 28 apps. We can also find 295 (0.8%) methods common to all 30 apps. Table III shows a summary of the behaviors observed. We observe the use of the file system (IO behaviors), the access to personal information (via the content provider), and the use of database-related libraries (DATABASE).
Details about the most relevant methods seen in this family are listed in Appendix C. When analyzing the common methods found, we can see that this family uses the DATABASE library to explore DDBB in method-1057. This library is used to explore data returned through a content provider, which is used to access data stored by other apps such as the contacts app. We can also observe that this type of ransoware uses its own crypto suit rather than relying on standard Java libraries. In particular, methods in com.nisakii.encrypt. * such as method-662, method-909 and method-1082 shown in Figure 9 are used to encrypt stolen files. Once files are encrypted they are erased as seen in method-1075, which uses the java.io.File.delete() API call for this. Method-1075 is part of the FileProvider class in the Landroid/support/v4/content library). This library has been developed by Google to provide newer features on earlier versions of Android.
As mentioned before, our system does not make a priori assumptions based on the name of the package or its provenance. This is simply because "legitimate libraries" can be used with a malicious intent 6 . This is precisely what happens with method-1075 (Fig. 9 )-while the library is built by Google and widely used in goodware, SIMPLOCKER heavily relies on it for malicious purposes.
B. Adware: The case of UTCHI and LOCKAD
We next present the case of two adware families named UTCHI and LOCKAD. This form of fraud typically monetize personal information to deliver targeted advertisement campaigns. While the campaign delivered by the former family has been operating for over three years and it is one of the most viral families, the latter is characterized by its novelty and stealthiness, and displays a clear distinction in the complexity of the malware evolution.
UTCHI is a family named after a shady advertisement library that leaks the user's personal information after being embedded into infected apps. The library has been piggybacked into over 13K apps distributed throughout different markets such as AppChina, Anzhi, or Google Play. This family is one of the top virals shown in Section II-A and it mostly operated between the end of 2015 and early 2016, although the campaign had been running for almost three years since the end of 2013 until mid 2016. From all samples processed, we observe that there are 27 methods with sensitive behaviors (cf. Section III-A) common to more than 12K apps. Table III shows a summary of the behaviors observed. Among others, these behaviors include network activity, access to content provider, access to unique serial numbers (via the telephony manager), and the use of reflection. Due to lack of space, we present the details of the most relevant methods seen in this family in Appendix D. Similar behaviors can be seen in other datahungry advertisement networks such as those observed in LEADBOLT, ADWO, KUGOU, or YOUMI. Similarly, LOCKAD piggybacks some libraries that are used to exfiltrate personal information from the user to later display unsolicited advertisements. Some of the services that are loaded as part of the infected app are:
com.dotc.ime.ad.service.AdService or mobi.wifi.adlibrary.AdPreloadingService. To avoid detection and hinder static analysis, samples in this family obfuscate certain core components of the embedded library. For instance, the library unpacks configuration parameters from an encrypted asset-file called 'cleandata' as shown in Figure 7 (method-345). These parameters are later used to decrypt additional content fetched from the Internet. Method-4670 contains the decryption routine that uses standard AES decryption in CBC mode and with PKCS5 Padding. The routines displayed in this figure have been reverse-engineered and method names (e.g., make_md5) have been renamed to better illustrate the behavior of this method. Finally, we can also observe in this family methods that provide support to run Text Executables. When running a dynamic analysis of one of the samples, we could corroborate that the APIs seen attempted to invoke several processes (e.g., /proc/ * /cmdline) to run the executables.
Apart from leaking personal information, both families also use reflection to dynamically load new functionality. 
C. First Seen 2017Q1: The case of HIDDENAP
We now present the case of a family called HIDDENAP that was first seen in early 2017 and soon after accounted for 83 samples in our dataset. HIDDENAP is one of the largest families seen in 2017 7 . Apps in this family are mainly distributed through alternative markets and all samples in our dataset have been obtained from one of the largest Chinese alternative market (i.e., the Anzhi market). This family is fairly basic and it only has 17 methods common to all apps. These methods exhibit behaviors mainly related to IO operations together with other standard actions from the Android framework such as the content provider (see Table III for a summary).
Once the device is infected, the malware runs an update attack in a method called com.secneo.guard.Util.checkUpdate() (method-17 in Appendix E, Figure 11 ). It then attempts to drop additional apps and install them with the support of some native libraries called libsecexe.so, libsecpreload.so, and SmartRuler.so that are embedded into the app. The last two libraries have been seen together with apps that are packed using a known service called Bangcle 8 [51] . The third library most likely contain a exploit that would grant root privileges to the malware. All native libraries are compiled both for x86 and ARM processors. Before loading the library, the malware first checks which is the right architecture of the device with Lcom/secneo/guard/Util.checkX86() (method-7) using standard API call such as File.exists() or System.getProperty().
Even though this family is using a packer to obfuscate parts of the code, the hook inserted in the Java part has meaningful method names that convey very accurately what the malware does. This indicates that the actor behind this family is either unexperienced of reckless. Considering that the app is obfuscated using an online packer, we can conclude that in this case the miscreant has a limited technical background.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first discuss a number of limitations of our study. Despite these limitations, our findings constitute a good approximation of the Android malware ecosystem. Thus, we later highlight the most important findings observed and discuss future trends and their implications for Android malware research.
A. Limitations
A sensible goal for a malware developer is to obfuscate or offload the rider to a remote host. We next discuss the challenges behind analyzing these type of threats together with the main limitation of differential analysis (i.e., the need for a precise accounting of the members in a family).
Obfuscation: Our study inherits the limitations of static analysis and thus can unavoidably miss obfuscated riders. In fact, we have observed not only that the use of cryptographic APIs has increased significantly over the years, but we have also seen that the number of common resources is smaller than expected. This problem is the scope of our future work as we explain next. Even when specimens rely on obfuscation, due to the nature of the Android platform they nonetheless require a trigger that would deobfuscate the payload. We can isolate these triggers using differential analysis as done in this work. This can aid dynamic analysis techniques to fuzz only those classes (and methods) where the hook to the obfuscated payload rests. Dynamic behaviors emanating from those payloads can then be used to extend the set of behaviors seen statically. Note that standalone dynamic analysis of repackaged malware also suffers from the problem, i.e., carrier-and rider-derived behaviors are intertwined. Thus, our differential analysis framework accordingly combined with dynamic analysis can overcome this limitation.
The underlying technique that we used to compute differential analysis assumes that piggybacked classes respect the morphology of their code (in terms of CFG). There are advanced obfuscation techniques such as polymorphic and metamorphic malware that could alter the structure of the code (including the CFG of their methods). Furthermore, recent work shows that it is feasible to use stegomalware to systematically add dynamic code [41] , [50] . This would render differential analysis useless. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence in the wild that would indicate that this type of obfuscation is used in Android malware at large.
Update Attacks: In update attacks, the rider is loaded at runtime [34] . Typically, the payload is stored in a remote host and retrieved after the app is executed as shown in [3] . Unless the rider is stored in plain text within the resources of an app, our study is vulnerable to this attack. We could overcome this limitation in a similar way as in the case of obfuscated malware-using dynamic analysis. For local update attacks, we recursively inspect every resource to find incognito apps. We append the methods of those apps to the methods of the main executable before running our differential analysis framework.
Notion of Family:
The way in which differential analysis is used in this paper requires a precise accounting of the members in a family. To do so, we rely on Euphony [21] which in turn leverages on threat intelligence shared from multiple AV vendors. Unifying diversified AV labels is a challenging process that might be subject to miss-classifications. This is simply because Euphony is forced to make decisions based on information given by AVs, whose family definitions might disagree with each other. Unifying labels is thus prone to error (especially with very recent malware families). Furthermore, the morphing nature of malware renders the notion of family incomplete and makes differential analysis dependent on the variants.
In our work, we overcome these challenges by introducing a of cutoff that is flexible can be configured. For the case of APIbased behaviors ( §III), we set the threshold to 90% rather than 100% to minimize the impact of potential miss-classifications in Euphony. The selection of this threshold was motivated based on the performance reported in [21] . In this setting, we show during the time-line analysis that grouping samples chronologically provides a more granular way to understand how variants of a family behave and, ultimately, how families evolve. For the case of file-based resources ( §IV) we set the threshold to 30%. This is because families have adopted the use of obfuscation later in their lifecycle and resources in some earlier variants remain un-obfuscated.
The cutoff chosen can cover a wide range of variants when combined with a chronological grouping. In any case, one could set the chosen thresholds even lower to fine-tune the granularity of the variants observed. However, this could risk the inclusion of code fragments coming from the carriers. This is because different goodware can import the same libraries as discussed in [25] . Thus, a set of carriers from the same family could have common legitimate libraries.
One option could be to 'white-list' those libraries and remove known software components before applying differential analysis. Along these lines, Google has recently proposed the use of what they call functional peers to set as 'normal' behaviors that are often seen in known goodware of the same category (peers) [33] . However, in our work we choose not to do this. The main reason behind this is that legitimate libraries can also be used with a malicious intent. In fact, the case study shown in Section V-A describes the case of a ransomware that uses the android.support.v4.content library with a malicious intent.
For our purpose, we consider that keeping a threshold relatively high (i.e., above 90%) is enough to avoid including code fragments from the carriers. As part of the future work, we are planning to study where the boundary between variants and carriers stand and the impact of lower thresholds. Here, we would further set a lower cutoff to explore behaviors that could either belong to the carrier or to the rider-namely, gray cutoff (GCO). Intuitively, thresholds can be seen as how likely the set of behaviors observed belong to the different parts of the specimen as described next:
• HCO: We could say with a high degree of confidence that a common method in this cutoff belongs to the set of behaviors that characterize the family as a whole.
• MCO: We could say with a high degree of confidence that a common method in this cutoff belongs to the set of behaviors that characterize a variant of this family.
• LCO: We could say with confidence that a common method in this cutoff belongs to the set of behaviors that characterize a smaller variant of this family.
• GCO: We could say that a common method in this cutoff might belong to the set of behaviors that characterize the carrier, but they could also belong to an outlier variant of this family. In this work we assume that if a method appears in a large portion of samples in a family, it can be considered harmful or it could potentially be used maliciously by most of the members of a family. As part of our future work, we are planning to taint all common methods that appear frequently in top ranked apps in Google Play. We also want to leverage on existing knowledge about piggybacked pairs of raiders and carriers to also taint methods that appear to be common [11] , [27] . In this case, common methods would reveal those software fragments that belong to the carrier as opposed to what we do in our paper. Tainted methods could also be used to elaborate on the aforementioned concept of functional peers to provide stronger guarantees of the software provenance in repackaged malware. All in all, this information can help to provide a notion of risk, where behaviors that appear mostly in riders and are never seen in goodware should be considered highly risky and vice versa.
B. Key Findings
In this work, we look at software components that can be attributed to malware alone. In particular, we look at: (i) Dalvik executables, (ii) text executables, and (iii) ELF executables to provide a cross-layer inspection. While our study inherits some limitations as discussed above, we observe a large number of apps displaying common, and more importantly, sensitive behaviors. Our findings constitute a large-scale longitudinal measurement of malice in the Android ecosystem. We next summarize the key takeaways of our work and discuss their implications to Android malware research.
Threat evolution: Our results show that certain threats have evolved rapidly over the last years. For example, premium-rate frauds that were seen in about 40% of the families in 2013 and dropped to 10% in late 2016. On the contrary, the use of native support has increased sharply from 15% in 2011 to 80% in 2017. From all resources explored, we also found that native behaviors are currently associated to vulnerability exploitation rather than exfiltration of personal information (i.e., Binder is barely used in common ELFs).
This only shows the importance of a time-line evaluation when developing new malware detection approaches, together with the need for research outcomes reporting results on samples with features tailored to the type of threat faced in each period. Recent works in the area [8] , [28] , [36] neither report time-lined results, nor use features from native libraries. These two items should constitute a guideline for future research in the area of malware detection. More recent works [30] have investigated the evolution of malware detection over time, but have not looked at how samples change.
Native code: We show that malware is increasingly using auxiliary executables, especially in the form of native libraries. Broadening the spectrum to goodware, recent reports have shown that the usage of native code accounts for approximately 37% of the apps in Google Play [2] . When accounting only for executables that are common to samples in a family or their variants, we observe that these figures are lower. In particular, we found 44 families with common resources (3.7% of all families). The total amount of samples in those families is about 4,7K samples (0.4% of all samples). However, results show otherwise when looking at the Java native support (JAVA NATIVE). Here, we can observe the number of families that have the capability to load native libraries from Java increases to 45.5%.
As mentioned, the difference between the number of common ELFs observed and the numbers reported from the JAVA NATIVE support can be attributed to either the use of obfuscation or to update attacks. When looking at the native support, we see an increase of 10% in the usage of native code than what is reported for malware. We believe that the large portfolio of native tools available in other platforms will contribute to the proliferation of malware relying on these type of payloads. This poses a major threat to current malware detection systems as they fail to analyze native code [44] . Thus, we position that future research efforts should focus on tools bridging the gap between cross-layer in the direction of recent work such as MALTON [48] . Also, recall that our study inherits the limitations of static analysis and malicious native libraries could also be stored remotely or obfuscated.
Evidence of obfuscation: A large scale investigation of the use of obfuscation in Google Play have recently shown that only 24.9% of the apps are obfuscated [47] . In this work we look at certain evidences of obfuscation among riders. In particular, we study the usage of crypto libraries, and three different forms of dynamic code execution: native code, Dalvik load, and script execution. We show that all forms of obfuscation are increasingly more popular in malware, with the usage of cryptography present in 90% of the families in 2017. When putting this in perspective with respect to legitimate apps [47] , we show sharp increase in the use these techniques. Discussions about the attribution of certain behaviors such as the use of obfuscation to repackaged malware have been recurrent in literature over the last few years [29] . Our findings strongly suggest that malware developers are ahead of primary developers.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few malware detection systems capable of dealing with these forms of obfuscation. For the case of reflection, authors in [35] proposed HARVESTER, a system that can resolve the targets of encoded reflective method calls. For the case of incognito apps, authors in [40] look at inconsistencies left by this type of obfuscated malware. While these approaches can deal with certain types of obfuscated malware, they are vulnerable to motivated adversaries. For instance, HARVESTER can not deal with static backward slicing attacks. Based on the evolution observed, we believe that the sophistication used to obfuscate malware is going to continue to increase.
Dynamic analysis constitutes next line of defense against obfuscation [44] . However, we have also observed that evasion is not only becoming more popular, but also more diverse. The research community has recently positioned that evasion attacks can be addressed with static analysis [16] -triggers can be first identified using symbolic execution and a smart stimulation strategy can then be devised. One major challenge here arise from the combination of obfuscation and evasion attacks. For instance, an adversary can use opaque predicates to hide the decryption routine of the malware to defeat both static and dynamic analysis. Standalone malware: We make no claims about the amount of standalone malware (i.e., malware that does not take advantage of repackaging) in the wild but we can report an estimate as depicted in our dataset. While we found that 25 families (542 samples) out of 1.2K+ families (1,282,022 million samples) could potentially be standalone malware, we also discarded all families with less than 7 samples per family from the original set of 3.2K+ families (1,299,109 samples) . This was due to the way differential analysis works, which requires a critical mass of samples. Given that standalone malware tends to have a small number of samples per family, one could assume that most of the samples discarded are standalone malware. If this holds true, a fair approximation of the number of standalone malware would then be about 2K families and 17K samples (62.5% of the families, but only 1.36% of the samples).
On the other hand, our dataset only contains samples that have been labeled into families by Euphony [21] . Unlabeled samples are known as Singletons, and there are about 200K of these in the AndroZoo [4] dataset as of the day we queried it. If we were to assume that all singletons are standalone malware, we will then be looking at figures of approximately 13%. It is worth highlighting this are just over-approximations and some of those samples are likely be early-stage repackaging.
While we estimate that standalone malware could range between 1.36% and 13% of the total malware samples in the wild, authors in [46] report that 35% of the samples in their study are standalone malware. They analyze roughly 405 samples, sampled from a larger dataset (cf. Section VII). Interestingly, some of the families that are flagged as standalone contain a large number of samples (e.g., LOTOOR and OPFAKE with 1.9K and 1.2K samples respectively), which seems unlikely. Even if the amount of standalone malware was higher than our estimate, or our dataset contains standalone families; we emphasize that differential analysis can still deal with this threat effectively with no impact to our findings. However, we argue that having a reliable understanding of how much standalone malware is in the wild is relevant to the community and this open question should be further addressed.
VII. RELATED WORK
There have been a number of works analyzing Android malware over the last years [1] , [29] . One of the first and perhaps the most relevant work putting Android malware in perspective was presented in 2012 [54] . Together with their work, authors released a dataset called Android Malgenome. This dataset was later extended in 2014 by authors in a project known as Drebin [8] . All samples in Malgenome and Drebin were first characterized using semi-manual efforts [39] , although in Drebin they later used automated techniques to systematize the detection of malware. These two datasets haven been widely explored in the past, however they have been both discontinued and recent studies have also shown that they are obsolete [46] .
More recently authors in [46] have studied the current landscape in the Android ecosystem looking at malware up until 2016. In their study, they manually analyze 405 samples from an original set of 24,650 apps in 71 families. Interestingly, the authors report finding 135 variants grouped around those 71 families. In our work, we explore about 1.2 million malicious samples structured in over 1,200 different malware families that span until 2017. To avoid manual efforts, we systematize the analysis of Android malware.
One of the key aspects to consider when systematizing the analysis of malware is properly curating the dataset to remove potential noise from samples. Works in the area of malware network analysis have recently shown that this process is of paramount importance [24] . In the Android realm, this is especially challenging due to the proliferation of repackaging attacks. We tackle this challenge by proposing the use of differential analysis, which is based on static analysis. Static analysis has been used in the past to systematize the study of the Android app ecosystem [14] . More recently, mining software structures has been successfully applied to the characterization of malware families in Malgenome [42] . However, up until now this was not used to study malware at large. Our study is in part possible thanks to (i) the proliferation of online repositories [4] , [23] that are not only storing the most recent samples, but also intelligence about them (see VirusTotal [45]); and (ii) recent advances in the systematization of informative labels obtained from multiple Anti-Virus (AV) vendors [38] , [21] . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first automated approach that after integrating all these recent efforts together scales this type of analysis up (avoiding manual analysis).
One important thing to note is that differential analysis can not only be used to analyze standalone malware, but also for piggybacked malware used in repackaging attacks. There have been several works looking at piggybacked malware in the last few years [53] , [52] , [12] , [11] , [3] . In the case of MassVet [11] , authors propose a similar methodology to find commonalty among apps. However, their focus is on the detection of repackaging via similarities in the Graphical User Interface (GUI). In the case of DroidNative [3] , authors look at the CFG of native code to distinguish between goodware and malware. Instead, we mine common code structures and measure the prevalence of API-call usage. This allow us to make a longitudinal measurement of the malware ecosystem unlike MassVet and DroidNative. Furthermore, our dataset of malware is about one order of magnitude larger than the one used in MassVet and about three order of magnitude larger than in DroidNative. Recently, authors in [27] propose a system to detect piggybacked apps. They also investigate behaviors seen in riders, however a key difference with our work is that they compare pairs of piggyback-original apps individually rather than providing a per-family overview. The scope of their work is limited to 950 pairs of apps seen between 2011 and 2014 as opposed to our work. The main advantage behind a perfamily longitudinal measurement is that findings here provide a holistic overview of the prevalence and evolution of malice. This is key to understand how to prioritize threats in real-world deployments.
Recent works in the area have proposed the use of common libraries to both locate malicious packages in piggybacked malware [26] and to create white-lists of Android libraries used in goodware [25] . In these two approaches, they leverage on the library name to build a package dependency graph and measure the similarity between package names. The afore discussed work [27] also uses package name matching to infer the ground truth. However, in our work, we choose not to rely on the package names as these can be easily obfuscated. Instead, we look at the CFG of different code units (methods). One major advantage of focusing on the internal structures of code (rather than on the package and method names) is that it provides an improved resistance against obfuscation. Note that program dependency graphs are resilient to layout obfuscation and forms of code mangling.
Finally, other more recent works have analyzed the evolution of Android by looking at permission requests [9] . Similar to the case of package names, the granularity obtained from permissions is not as precise as API-annotated CFG.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS In this paper, we presented a systematic study of the evolution of rider behaviors in the Android malware ecosystem. We addressed the challenge of analyzing repackaged malware by using differential analysis. Our study provides a cross-layer perspective that inspects the prevalence of sensitive behaviors in different executables, including native libraries. Our analysis on over 1.2 million samples that span over a long period of time showed that malware threats on Android have evolved rapidly, and evidences the importance of developing antimalware systems that are resilient to such changes. This means that automated approaches relying on machine-learning should come together with a carefully crafted feature engineering process, trained on datasets that are as recent as possible and well balanced. We have further discussed what our findings mean for Android malware detection research, highlighting other areas that need special attention by the research community. 
APPENDIX

A. Type of Text Executables
An illustrative example of the type of text executables embedded within the resources of an app is presented in Figure 8 . In this example, the script fetches a payload called tftpbrute and attempts to install it as a hidden file in the solid-state drive of the device. The payload is presumably an executable used to run a FTP brute force attack. In a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) context, this malware could turn the device into a zombie endpoint capable of probing private networks that would otherwise be unreachable from the Internet.
In our study, we parse every text executable that is in common to the sample of malware families according threshold set and extract a set of features. We look at some frequent bash commands and other relevant keywords observed in different payloads in the wild. Table IV summarizes some of these features. Table V shows the prevalence of studied functions across all three cutoffs. Similar to the case of text executables, the number of families with common ELFs is small. This is again expected as these type of resources are also commonly obfuscated. Figure 9 show some details about the most relevant methods seen. For the sake of simplicity, the CFG of the method is not listed and only annotations are shown (i.e., class and method name, sensitive API calls invoked within the CFG of the method, and number of apps sharing this method). While the class name and the method name might change across apps in the family, we include a randomly chosen example as reference. Figure 10 show details of the most relevant methods seen while studying the case of UTCHI. Note that names are obfuscated to make the reverse engineering process more difficult.
B. Features in Native Libraries
C. The case of SIMPLOCKER
D. The case of UTCHI
Behaviors observed in most of the common methods show repeated accesses to private information. For instance, aq.b() (method-6) queries the content provider to list all apps installed with PackageManager:getInstalledPackages. Other private information such as details about the data network are extracted in method-19 using ConnectivityManager:getActiveNetworkInfo API call. As this library extracts unique hardware identifiers from the device, user behaviors can be tracked across multiple malicious apps.
Apart from leaking personal information, this family also uses reflection to dynamically load new functionality as seen in method-12.
E. The case of HIDDENAP Excerpt of common methods from the case study of HIDDE-NAP. The malware runs an update attack in method-17. Later, it attempts to drop additional apps and install them with the support of some native libraries. Before loading the library,
